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Humanitarian Aid and the Struggle
for Peace and Justice:
Organizational Innovation after a Blind Date
JOSEPH G. BOCK
University of Notre Dame
Eck Institute for Global Health
Humanitarian organizations working in developing countries
have gone through a transformation since the thaw of the Cold
War. Their increased programming to promote justice and peace
has resulted in disparate partnership configurations. Illustra-
tive examples of these configurations show how organizational
deficiencies and challenges have spawned innovation. These in-
novations provide insight about how similar organizations might
usefully be engaged in the struggle to promote greater justice
and peace in areas of the world suffering from violent conflict.
Key words: violent conflict, identity-based conflict, humanitarian
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Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and those that struggle for justice and peace have been devel-
oping various forms of partnerships at an accelerating rate.
Two developments have fostered this partnering. The first is
the greater awareness that humanitarian aid can have both
positive and negative impact on tensions of the host country
population. The second development is the increased funding
by donor governments and multilateral organizations for
conflict-related programming. For example, U.S. Agency of
International Development (USAID) created the Office of
Transition Initiatives (though this office has focused mainly
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on providing in-kind support to indigenous NGOs). More re-
cently, USAID created the Office of Conflict Management and
Mitigation as a part of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance. These branches of USAID provide
funding for conflict-related programming.
In this article, I describe some of the reasons behind the col-
laboration of disparate types of organizations and some of the
challenges they face. I then present five examples of organiza-
tional innovation that, together, provide insights about how
configurations might be developed for effective programming
that combines humanitarian aid with the promotion of justice
and peace in developing countries.
Evolving Organizational Imperatives
For years, the objectives of humanitarian aid (such as pro-
viding food, potable water, and plastic sheeting after a flood)
and conflict transformation (such as training moderate reli-
gious leaders in anti-incitement or political leaders in negotia-
tion skills) were distinct and separate from each other. Many
humanitarian NGOs were created in the wake of World War
II, and the Cold War between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States followed shortly thereafter. In
a Cold War context, conflict transformation was viewed as too
"political" for humanitarian organizations which prided them-
selves on that impartiality. Conflict transformation NGOs, on
the other hand, tended to utilize a relatively narrow repertoire
of methodologies, namely mediation techniques. Humanitarian
NGOs with an explicit conflict transformation agenda (fo-
cusing substantially on promoting justice and peace in addi-
tion to relief and development), such as Mennonite Central
Committee, were both atypical and modestly funded. The
larger humanitarian NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children,
and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), generally speaking, sought
to maintain their neutrality with a rationale that it was their
role to help the victims of conflict and the purview of diplo-
mats and politicians to prevent or stop wars from happening.
This division of humanitarian from justice and peace pro-
gramming changed gradually over the years following the
thaw of the Cold War. Skirmishes between groups within
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nation-states allied with the respective superpowers became
an anachronism while conflict between those of different iden-
tities (related to ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, tribe, or
a combination of these), including instances without external
encouragement and support, grew in frequency. No longer
were humanitarian NGOs kept at a distance from conflict-
related programming by the "high politics" of the Cold War.
Rather than encountering rebels or paramilitary factions fight-
ing in "proxy wars," humanitarian NGOs were faced with in-
ternal and regional conflicts. These consisted of one identity
group pitted against one or more others in a bloody contest
for control, or of regional "warlords" with powerful armies
pursuing enormous financial gain, skillfully pitting one group
against another, often by enkindling or inventing ancient en-
mities related to past injustices (Rudolf & Rudolf, 1993). Local,
national, and regional disputes erupted without the influence
of bi-polar superpower politics. It became clear that aid itself
was often political and partisan, or perceived as such, when
victims of conflict and other disasters of one identity group
received support when others did not, or arrangements were
made with groups perpetrating violence as a way of securing
safe passage for relief supplies (otherwise known as "corridors
of tranquility"). Humanitarian NGOs found themselves in the
middle of disputes between people of different identities that
were fueled by "grievance," "greed," and "failure of the social
contract" (Korf, 2005; Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). A position
of standing in the background was no longer morally tenable.
In addition, humanitarian NGOs experienced an urging from
donors to become involved in conflict transformation, some-
times with diplomatic support in the corridors of political
power providing some leeway for programmatic inventive-
ness and assertiveness.
At the same time, humanitarian NGOs began looking criti-
cally at how their aid impacted inter-group tensions. For in-
stance, some had distributed food aid for decades. They began
an introspective process of asking why people did not have
enough food and what could be done to change agricultural
and trade policies that would bring about greater food secu-
rity. Many supported the "Do No Harm" initiative (Anderson,
1999), which sought to distill lessons learned about how to
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not inadvertently exacerbate tensions with humanitarian as-
sistance. Some humanitarian NGOs took this evolution a step
further and developed free-standing conflict transformation
projects aimed at addressing such contentious matters as land
disputes.
Organizations and Challenges
There are five main types of entities that have engaged in
various organizational configurations to promote justice and
peace internationally. These are international humanitarian
NGOs, advocacy-oriented peace and justice NGOs, service-
oriented peace and justice NGOs, for-profit contractors, and
academic entities (such as peace institutes or programs at uni-
versities). Each type of organization, on its own, faces chal-
lenges that can conceivably be addressed by some form of
partnership with one or more of the other types of entities.
International Humanitarian NGOs
Large international humanitarian NGOs have budgets in
the hundreds of millions of dollars, programs in as many as
110 countries, and thousands of expatriate and national staff
members. They typically encounter high staff turnover and
frequent reassignment, which makes being "learning organi-
zations" difficult. Some of the larger ones develop their own
technical support units. CRS, for instance, has a Program
Quality and Support Department. But even when such a unit
is created, staff turnover and transfers are disruptive to insti-
tutional memory, especially when major disasters pull people
into emergency responses.
Peacebuilding technical support staff members are often
under pressure to do monitoring, evaluation and proposal
writing, the projects of which are often funded by government
donors like the USAID or by multilateral institutions like the
United Nations' Development Program, or a combination of
the two. This constrains the membership of their learning com-
munities, because of their specialized terminology and acro-
nyms. Engaging outsiders, including academics, is awkward
due in part to this specific vocabulary.
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Advocacy-Oriented Justice and Peace NGOs
Those NGOs that focus on justice and peace advocacy
typically have offices in Washington, DC, New York, or Brussels,
Belgium, or all three, to cultivate policy changes with the U.S.
Government, the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the United Nations (UN), or the European Union. These
organizations face daunting challenges in raising money from
individuals. At a meeting of the Peace and Security Initiative,
a collaborative effort of foundations and NGOs focusing on
foreign policy issues, it was acknowledged that NGOs involved
exclusively in research and advocacy on foreign policy issues
are overly reliant on foundations,' and foundation grants tend
to be fickle. They typically last between one and three years.
Foundations often expect unrealistically that these NGOs will
have sustainable funding after the grant funding discontinues.
What this means in practice is that advocacy-oriented justice
and peace NGOs will typically survive only if they develop
multiple foundations to support them, along with other major
donors (usually private individuals).
It is important to keep in mind that it is much easier to raise
money for humanitarian relief and development than it is for
advocating for policy change. As a result, advocacy organiza-
tions do not typically have the funding for programming that
can lay an educational foundation upon which to build a criti-
cal mass of involved citizens.
Service-Oriented Justice and Peace NGOs
In contrast to advocacy-oriented justice and peace NGOs,
those that provide conflict transformation services, primarily
in mediation, are more apt to develop sustainable funding by
charging fees. An example is Collaborative Decision Resources
Associates, based in Boulder, Colorado. It provides negotiation
support to foreign governments, federal government depart-
ments, state governments, and Native American tribes.
The challenge service-oriented justice and peace NGOs
face is in getting an adequate amount of steady business to
remain financially solvent. Financial survival sometimes re-
quires that a few core staff members are on the payroll while
others are pulled into projects on an as-needed basis. The non-
core staff members are typically on temporary contracts, and
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the revenue they generate is often a subsidy to their more reli-
able income in an academic setting.
Contractors
Contractors are for-profit entities (though some barely
stay solvent) and, supposedly, take on a higher degree of li-
ability for program performance than those that receive
grants under cooperative agreements (which NGOs typi-
cally receive). Examples of contractors are Chemonics,
Development Alternatives Incorporated (now simply called
DAI), Research Triangle International (RTI), and Associates in
Rural Development (which is now simply called ARD since
becoming a subsidiary of Tetra Tech).
The volume of governmental funding going to contrac-
tors has increased in recent years. USAID, among others,
has awarded contracts to reach specific program objectives.
According to Rachel McCleary (2010) "United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) reported that from
fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2005, the share of funds awarded
to for-profit contractors rose from 33 percent to 58 percent" (p.
1).
Contractors are by nature project-oriented. They hire a
Chief of Party to oversee project activities. They typically do
not establish country programs but, instead, set up an opera-
tion for the specific purpose of project execution. Unlike NGOs,
contractors do not contribute matching funds, and they tend to
be willing to accept money from entities like the Department
of Defense in addition to the USAID.
Staff members of international NGOs sometimes generalize
about contractors, calling them "beltway bandits" (referring to
the location of many of the contractors' headquarters, near the
Beltway surrounding Washington, DC). One reason is due to
competition and the increasing amount of U.S. Government
funding going to contractors which NGO staff members feel
they could more effectively utilize. There is also a common
perception that contractors do not engage the local population,




Universities and colleges have supported NGOs and con-
tractors engaged in justice and peace. Individuals and groups
of faculty members serve as consultants, usually by assisting
in conceptualizing a problem. The understanding that de-
velops is then used in project design or in staff training pro-
grams. While academic institutions do not have the in-depth
knowledge from on-the-ground work as do staff members of
NGOs and contractors, they do bring theoretical and compara-
tive perspectives that can be useful for some justice and peace
efforts. Academic institutions, especially those that engage
tenured faculty, can also provide added institutional memory
to NGOs and contractors that suffer from high staff turnover
and transfer rates. Faculty members, however, usually need to
be engaged over a period of years to develop an accurate un-
derstanding of the donor and political environment in which
NGOs and contractors work.
Organizational Innovation
In this section, I provide examples of some of the organi-
zational configurations which have developed in justice and
peace programming. This is by no means an exhaustive list
but is meant to be illustrative of the kind of innovation that
has been taking place. It is hoped that these examples will shed
light on which combinations work well in achieving greater
justice and peace.
Producing Toolkits
CRS went through an organizational transformation in
the late 1990s, during which it developed what is commonly
called its "justice lens" (Fast & Lindsteadt, 1998). Rather than
simply trying to help pull people out of poverty, CRS leader-
ship insisted that they ask why people were impoverished in
the first place.
As CRS leaders sought to imbue each of their country pro-
grams in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with an orientation
aimed at addressing underlying causes of poverty and violence,
they sought the help of the Kroc Institute for International
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Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The two orga-
nizations exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding that
stated, in part, that a regular "peacebuilding institute" would
be conducted in which CRS staff from all over the world
would get trained by Kroc Institute faculty Over the years,
a more substantial "learning alliance" was created with the
CRS' South East Asia Region. Insights from the annual work-
shops in South East Asia were documented by a CRS regional
staff member focused on justice and peace. Over three years,
enough common terminology and material had been pro-
duced to create Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring,
and Learning Toolkit (Lederach, Neufeldt, & Culbertson, 2007).
The toolkit is in its second printing, has been translated from
English into French and Spanish, and has been downloaded
from the internet on a scale much beyond what either CRS or
the Kroc Institute anticipated.
Another example of developing a toolkit is a collaborative
initiative of Church World Service (CWS), the relief and devel-
opment arm of a number of Christian Protestant denomina-
tions, and Eastern Mennonite University's Center for Justice
and Peacebuilding. CWS is a smaller organization than CRS.
In some respects, its size precludes achieving economies of
scale in technical support related to justice and peace. As a
result, CWS leadership explored a working relationship with
the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding's STAR Program
(Seminars in Trauma Awareness and Recovery). The Program
had been launched in the United States following the devas-
tation of September 11, 2001. Church World Service leaders
were impressed by the project and asked Center for Justice and
Peace faculty and staff if they would be interested in doing the
same kind of work in war-torn countries. The two entities ex-
changed a Memorandum of Understanding and implemented
a week-long training program in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2004,
involving 45 civil society and church leaders (Church World
Service, 2004). As was the case of collaboration between CRS
and the Kroc Institute, STAR produced a toolkit that has been





Mercy Corps decided that its approach to building its ca-
pacity to engage in justice and peace programming would be
to merge with Conflict Management Group (CMG), a service-
oriented justice and peace NGO (Mercy Corps, 2004). CMG
was facing financial challenges, despite its stellar reputation
and credibility from being founded by one of the authors of
the classic conflict resolution book Getting to Yes (Fisher &
Ury, 1981) and being affiliated with the Harvard Negotiation
Project. Fees for services proved to be feast or famine, with
rather too much famine.2
Mercy Corps, on the other hand, raised private, governmen-
tal, and multilateral support with relative ease. The merger, in
2004, was seen as mutually advantageous in that Mercy Corps
increased its conflict transformation capacity while CMG
staff members kept their jobs-even continuing to reside in
Cambridge, Massachusetts even though Mercy Corps' head-
quarters is in Portland, Oregon (Mercy Corps, 2004).
But the merger had a rocky start, due mainly to the type of
services that CMG staff members provided. They were experts
at mediation. And in war-torn countries, mediation is typical-
ly undertaken by diplomats, not NGO staff members. But by
2009, Mercy Corps' conflict transformation activities included
not only training Iraqi leaders in consensus building and ne-
gotiation, but also: resolving land disputes in Guatemala; sup-
porting regional initiatives to reduce clan violence in northern
Somalia related to competition for firewood and water, youth
unemployment, environmental degradation and drug abuse;
working with over 400 tribal elders, government officials,
youth, women, and religious leaders in Kenya's Rift Valley to
reduce election-related violence; and supporting the creation
of 820 youth clubs in Nepal to minimize inter-ethnic conflict
following a decade-long civil war. Mercy Corps has been
pleased with the results of the merger. According to the organi-
zation's website, "Mercy Corps' 2004 merger with the Conflict
Management Group strengthened our ability to implement
conflict programs worldwide. Over its 20-year history, the
Conflict Management Group developed a widely acclaimed
reputation built on interest-based negotiation methodology.
By blending their vast experience in negotiations theory and
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practice with Mercy Corps' global experience in conflict and
post-conflict settings, the merger created possibilities that were
not possible as separate organizations" (Mercy Corps, 2009).
Making Handoffs and Building a Foundation
American Refugee Committee (ARC) works in war-torn
countries around the globe. ARC's staff members often see
gross violations of human rights. In one instance, one of ARC's
country directors communicated passionately with ARC head-
quarters in Minneapolis about the need to advocate with the
U.S. government and the United Nations about abductions
of children by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern
Uganda and southern Sudan. The conundrum facing ARC lead-
ership in its headquarters was that if ARC was visible in such
advocacy, there could be repercussions for its staff members
working in those countries. This was especially so because
ARC's logo was prominently depicted on vehicles, in part to
make sure that government troops and LRA rebels knew of its
humanitarian identity.
ARC leadership overcame this challenge by commu-
nicating information gleaned from the Uganda/southern
Sudan program staff to one of the ARC board members. The
board member was an executive at Refugees International, a
prominent advocacy-oriented NGO in Washington. As such,
Refugees International benefited from the on-the-ground in-
formation while ARC did not compromise the safety of its staff
in Uganda and southern Sudan.3
Another example of a handoff relationship exists between
CRS and the Justice, Peace and Development Department of
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
CRS was contacted by one of its country representatives about
a law in South Asia that resulted in the capricious prosecu-
tion of religious minorities. For CRS to have been visibly in-
volved in advocacy with the U.S. Congress and the diplomatic
community to address this injustice would have put CRS staff
members in South Asia in a compromising position relative
to extremist groups. So CRS contacted the Justice, Peace and
Human Development Department in Washington about the




But a more interesting organizational development oc-
curred with CRS relative to the USCCB, whereby a more robust
foundation for advocacy is being laid. CRS and USCCB lead-
ership recognized that advocacy on justice and peace issues
would be limited without educating the public. In this case,
the U.S. Catholic community comprises the largest single de-
nomination in the United States-roughly 70 million people
in a population of 310 million. The Church has considerable
infrastructure-parishes, schools, colleges and universities.
CRS' budget dwarfs that of the Justice, Peace and Human
Development Department of the USCCB. People donate to
CRS primarily because of its humanitarian work. But some of
the donations are unrestricted as to their use. So CRS chan-
neled some of its unrestricted funds to an entirely new depart-
ment called U.S. Operations, opening regional offices in major
cities across the United States with the mandate to engage the
U.S. Catholic community in education and advocacy. This or-
ganizational innovation builds a foundation of educated sup-
porters who can engage in public policy advocacy on behalf of
those suffering from injustice, violence, and poverty to address
root causes as well as immediate needs.
CRS' U.S. Operations efforts have also engaged academic
institutions. Rather than collaborating for technical support
and the creation of toolkits, a partnership with universities has
spawned an education and advocacy initiative on campuses
throughout the country (Catholic Relief Services, 2010).
Securing Community Involvement and Technical Support
In 2004, DAI was awarded a contract from the USAID for
its Sri Lanka Transition Initiatives Program. DAI established
offices in Colombo, Trincomalee, Ampara, Matara, and Batticalo
and provided grants totaling approximately $30 million to
"local government entities, nongovernmental organizations,
community-based organizations and, to a lesser extent, inter-
national nongovernmental organizations, chambers of com-
merce, trader and farmer associations, student groups, and the
media" (DAI, 2009).
Because of the technical challenges of meeting contract spec-
ifications for an early warning system that would incorporate
events data development, digital mapping, and mathematical
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pattern recognition, DAI engaged Virtual Research Associates,
another consulting firm, to provide technical support (Virtual
Research Associates, 2008).4 This specialized technical knowl-
edge was unavailable in Sri Lanka.
In 2008, DAI received additional funding for its Sri Lanka
Transition Initiatives Program from the U.S. Department of
Defense to assist people displaced by conflict in Sri Lanka's
Eastern Province. DAI worked with local contractors to reha-
bilitate health facilities, schools, and other public infrastruc-
ture using "an inclusive participatory community consultation
process" (DAI, 2009).
This example illustrates how for-profit contractors some-
times work closely with national NGOs, government officials
and other entities. It also shows how the use of other for-profit
entities is typically related to areas where substantial techni-
cal expertise is needed. And, finally, it shows how contractors
are willing, unlike most NGOs, to accept funding from the
Department of Defense for humanitarian projects.
Conclusion
Supporting justice and peace while also engaging in hu-
manitarian relief and development is perhaps analogous to an
emergency assistance social service agency developing an ad-
vocacy arm and the capacity to do group therapy. The skill sets
are different. The networks are different. The terminologies are
different.
Organizations have adapted, however, and aligned them-
selves in creative combinations that take advantage of their re-
spective strengths. No single organizational configuration will
work all the time. Instead, it is helpful to ponder the experi-
ences of those who have had the imagination and inventive-
ness to build creative partnerships.
What might we learn from these examples? First, interna-
tional humanitarian NGOs that have staff members operat-
ing in developing countries can benefit from having a close
partnership with advocacy-oriented NGOs. Handing off infor-
mation that could compromise the security of staff members
or the mission of the aid itself to an entity that specializes in
advocacy can enhance staff security in the field and provide
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needed on-the-ground information that can enhance the accu-
racy and authenticity of advocacy efforts.
Second, service-oriented NGOs that are skilled in mediation
will probably find it challenging to merge with humanitarian
NGOs. Those skilled in mediation, however, are likely to enjoy
greater job security and, over time, will learn how to adapt
their services to a wider range of humanitarian interventions.
Third, academic institutions can play a vital role in sup-
porting the justice and peace initiatives of humanitarian
NGOs by assisting with workshops and producing "toolkits."
Furthermore, the research and instruction of faculty members
involved is improved by interacting with practitioners with
on-the-ground experience. Academic institutions can also help
NGOs promote greater engagement of the U.S. public in advo-
cacy related to justice, peace, and poverty.
Fourth, on some projects, contractors work with national
and local NGOs, but also reach out to other for-profit firms for
technical support. While most NGOs neither pursue nor accept
funding from the Department of Defense for fear that staff se-
curity in conflict zones will be compromised, contractors are
more apt to pursue and accept such funding in conflict zones.
This reflects how NGOs usually operate in a specific country
or region for long periods, ideally getting to know the culture
and leadership of a given place, while the contractors discon-
tinue project operations when a contract expires. In addition,
NGOs' security is usually based on "acceptance" by the local
population rather than "protection" from harm. Contractors,
in contrast, are usually more apt to hire armed guards, being
more inclined to use "protection."
And, finally, if one looks at these evolving partnerships
over time, from a social work perspective, it is evident that
systemic reasons for poverty, for violence, and for injustice are
increasingly being addressed. It is easy to understand and to
raise money for charity. It is difficult, relatively, to understand
and raise money to do systemic change. But with a "systems
theory" perspective, the tide is turning. More specifically,
NGOs are embracing a "strategic peacebuilding" version of
that theory, which holds that structures that lead to violent con-
flict must be addressed systematically. Specifically, it involves
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... the creation and nurturing of constructive
relationships-at every level of society-across ethnic,
religious, class, and racial boundaries. ... [Practitioners]
seek the nonviolent and collaborative resolution of
social inequities and the transformation of structural
conditions that generate deadly conflict. The range of
relationship-building activities encompasses the entire
conflict cycle and includes conflict prevention, conflict
management, conflict resolution and transformation,
and post-conflict reconciliation. (Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, 2010, para. 1)
Those NGOs that pursue this approach are venturing
forward into relatively new territory, less focused on symp-
toms and more focused on causes. What more could one ask
for after a blind date?
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(Endnotes)
1. Comments about the difficulty of raising money were made
during Peace and Security Initiative meetings in Washington, DC in
2003 and 2004 which I attended.
2. At the time of the merger, I spoke with a number of CMG staff
members.
3. I know of this example personally because I was Vice President at
ARC at the time.
4. I am familiar with the involvement of Virtual Research Associates
through communication with its President, Doug Bond. I spoke with
him about my experiences with the Foundation for Co-Existence,
most of which was as a consultant with The Asia Foundation.
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